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A. What Is Consumer Law?
Consumer law developed as a discrete body of law to address
perceived deficiencies resulting from the application of commer-
cial law rules to transactions involving a merchant seller on one
side and a nonerchant purchaser of property, credit, or servic-
es primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose on the
other side. In such transactions, the nonmerchant often does not
know which transaction terms are customary and which are not,
and arguably is not capable of understanding, or is not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to understand, the writing evidencing
the transaction. Moreover, the writing usually is prepared by the
merchant, and the terms of it are not bargained for-except
perhaps price, delivery, and similar matters. Even if an attempt
to bargain were made, it would not be successful (except within
narrow limitations on issues such as price) because, to the mer-
chant, the loss of one transaction is of no particular conse-
quence, and the cost of tailoring the transaction far exceeds its
value.'
* Kenneth McAfee Centennial Professor and George Lynn Cross Research Profes-
sor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Executive Director, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The discussion in this Article raises a number of positions for consideration by
the Drafting Committee revising U.C.C. Article 2. The positions do not necessarily
represent the views of the author, or of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.
1. Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A,
39 ALA. L. REv. 957, 957-58 (1988). At least, this position represents the standard
learning. One might question whether consumers today are not more sophisticated
and better educated (or at least better able to acquire representation) and whether
business is as predatory as the learning suggests, or whether competition significant-
ly lessens business' ability to impose terms against customer interests. Of course,
there always will be an underclass for which the conventional wisdom holds true,
but perhaps special regulatory legislation should be adopted for this underclass rath-
er than alter the rules that work reasonably well for others.
1565
1566 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1565
Accordingly, consumer law rules attempt to address the per-
ceived imbalance by mandating segregated or highlighted disclo-
sure of terms so that the consumer can quickly review and un-
derstand the salient terms of the transaction (as determined by
the legislative body) and can refuse to close the transaction if
those terms are not agreed upon or are not sufficiently favor-
able.2 Consumer laws also can regulate the terms themselves
when the consumer, even with adequate disclosure, is unlikely
to be able to negotiate reasonable terms because of inequality of
bargaining power, lack of competing choices, or similar condi-
tions.'
B. Uniformity and Nonuniformity in Consumer Law
While the rationale giving rise to consumer law is uniformly
accepted, the uniform application of that rationale has been far
less common. In the 1960's and 1970's, several major efforts to
encourage the development of a uniform consumer law began.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code achieved very limited suc-
One view believes that this same learning applies in the case of small business.
No doubt that may be true in many cases, but the repetitive nature of business as
well as its greater ability to afford representation arguably make the risk of having
special rules for this class of persons or transactions outweigh the benefits.
2. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
More closely related to U.C.C. Article 2 is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988). The Magnuson-Moss Act requires a warrantor warrant-
ing a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty to disclose
fully and conspicuously in simple and readily understood language the terms and
conditions of the written warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1988) (supplemented by Fed-
eral Trade Commission regulations at 16 C.F.R. § 701 (1993)).
Of course, absent pre-closing disclosure allowing the consumer to shop around
and compare customary terms, disclosure is of limited utility. Disclosure laws thus
normally mandate or encourage pre-closing disclosure. See, e.g., Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637, 1637a, 1638, 1681 (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1993) (Magnuson-
Moss regulations).
A less effective variant is to flag a particular term in the contract. Article 2
contains several examples of this approach. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990) (re-
quiring the presence of the term "merchantability" to disclaim the warranty).
3. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1988) (setting limit of liabil-
ity for unauthorized use on credit cards); id. § 1647 (limiting home equity line terms
in some cases); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (1988) (prohibiting
the conditioning of a warranty on the use of additional goods or services); id. § 2308
(limiting a warrantor's ability to disclaim an implied warranty).
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cess on the state level. Seven states and Guam enacted the 1968
version of that statute,4 and only four states enacted the updat-
ed and more consumer oriented 1974 version.5 The Uniform
Consumer Sales Practices Act was even less successful. With
only four state enactments, and those with substantial devia-
tion, it has been reduced to "model act" status.' Thus, in most
jurisdictions, legislatures have grafted special consumer rules on
to the general statutory treatment of the area of perceived need,
whether it be usury, insurance, or something else, rather than
enacting them in a unified and uniform way. Consequently,
because the state laws in these areas are diverse, the resulting
consumer rules are equally diverse.7 In addition, the individual
states, to some extent, have varying perceptions of the areas in
need of special consumer legislation and wide diversity of opin-
ion as to the extent of any protection needed. In the end, as one
commentator noted:
[Clonsumerism, like politics, is basically local. A consumer
agenda that might delight an activist group in Massachusetts
could find rejection with a similar group in Texas, which, of
course, had its own agenda. Legislatures in the 1960s and
4. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7 U.L.A. 208 (1985) (1968 Act).
5. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (1974 Act). Moreover, one
of those states, Wisconsin, enacted a far more consumer oriented version, and vir-
tually none of the enactments were in substantially uniform form. On the other
hand, various states, like Alabama and Louisiana, borrowed a substantial number of
provisions from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, as did the Federal Truth in
Lending Act. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 5-19-1 to 5-19-31 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:3510-9:3573.8 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
6. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1992-93
REFERENCE BOOK 106. A "uniform act" is one for which there is substantial reason
to anticipate enactment in a large number of jurisdictions; conversely a "model act"
may promote uniformity and minimize diversity but a significant number of jurisdic-
tions may not adopt the act in its entirety. Id. at 99. In fairness, provisions akin to
those in the Consumer Sales Practices Act often have appeared as a part of a
broader deceptive practices statute in many states.
7. See, e.g., BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
(ALI-ABA 1965). Where the basic law is more uniform, however, the consumer rules
also tend to be more uniform, even when they are separated from the basic law.
See, e.g., [State U.C.C. Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) (noting nonuniform
state amendments restricting disclaimers throughout); 3 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND,
HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-608:03.5 (Supp. 1993) (discussing
liability limits and providing a chart of state lemon laws). Perhaps this observation
is an important one for future guidance.
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1970s delighted in passing laws that addressed the latest
creditor outrage that was featured in the media. Consumer
protection statutes usually cost the state nothing and, wheth-
er effective or not, are invariably popular with constituents.
Legislatures had no wish to give up this pursuit in the inter-
est of uniformity. Consumer frauds, though universal, are not
uniform.'
The other major effort to create a uniform consumer law oc-
curred on the federal level, and, in contrast, was outstandingly
successful. Beginning with the Truth in Lending Act9 in the late
1960's, Congress enacted an avalanche of legislation that created
an extensive body of federal consumer law1" that, subject to
varying case interpretation," was uniform nationally. While
the volume of this legislative activity has diminished in the
1980's and 1990's, it has not ceased, and further enactments
have appeared periodically, 2 as have regulations that bear
much resemblance to statutory enactments. 3
8. William Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
811, 812 (1993).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Other statutes include the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j
(1988); Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (1988); Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1692-1692o (1988); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617
(1988); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
11. At one point, case law interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act was quite
diverse. See Fred H. Miller, Truth in Lending Act, 34 BUS. LAW. 1405 (1979) [here-
inafter Miller, Truth in Lending]. Subsequent amendments alleviated the problem.
However, the problem exists with any uniform act, federal or state, including the
Uniform Commercial Code. Compare Garden Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 267 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div.), affd, 223 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1966) with
Sequoyah State Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 621 S.W.2d 683 (Ark. 1981). These cases
view the rights as to money orders very differently. Again, subsequent amendments
should alleviate the problem. See U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 4 (1990) (describing Article 's
treatment of money orders). Moreover, the Commentary project of the Permanent
Editorial Board should substantially curtail the development of future problems in
this respect. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
703, 710 n.25 (1993) [hereinafter Miller, Karl's Kode].
12. E.g., Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988); Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1988); Community Rein-
vestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1988); Truth in Savings Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. E.g., Federal Trade Commission "Holder" Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1993); Credit
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Understandably, agencies can promulgate regulations without
becoming bogged down in the diversity and irregularity of the
various state approaches to a matter,'4 but how can Congress
enact legislation in areas where the state legislatures cannot?
One commentator explained the phenomenon as follows:
In Congress, [a] bill [is in] the province of a subcommittee,
having life or death control over the measure, with a chair
and staff that might have been quite unfamiliar with the
complexities .... Roles would have been played; voices would
have been raised. But no one would have listened because
everyone would have understood that the real work was be-
ing done in private. Access to the subcommittee members and
the staff would determine the shape that the final legislation
would take. The issues would have been publically aired but
privately brokered."
Congress, after all, need not seek consensus. With a few
key subcommittee members, a dedicated staff and a sympa-
thetic leadership, Congress can act decisively in the face of
considerable opposition. One can only conclude that the pa-
tient, conciliatory, consensus-building approach [of the state
uniform law process] ... is not the approach to enhanced
consumer protection. 6
Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1993); Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429
(1993).
14. The simple fact that the states have acted in an area at all tends to satisfy
two of the criteria of the Federal Trade Commission for promulgation of a rule
against unfairness. These criteria--evidence of consumer injury outweighing any
countervailing benefits of the practice, and violation of public policy as established
by statute or other means-are the basis upon which the FTC's consumer protection
rules are predicated. Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Senators Ford and
Danforth on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Neil N. Averitt, The Meaning of
"Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO.
L.J. 225, 288, 291-95 (1981).
15. Warren, supra note 8, at 815-16.
16. Id. at 822. Perhaps the two most salient recent examples that support this
view are the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988), where
Congress took a problem that was not a national one and used it to modernize the
check collection system, something that the state process was unable to do in the
never-adopted New Payments Code, see Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer,
Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26
LOY. L. L. REV. 743, 745 (1993) (discussing the "unfortunate end" of the NPC),
and the Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
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C. The Problem for the 1990's
At this juncture, a dilemma surfaces. Commercial law, in
particular the law of sales on which the current focus rests, is
primarily state law,'7 and there does not appear to be substan-
tial sentiment to change that approach.18 Of course Article 2
originally was prepared in the 1950's, before the consumer
movement had become a legislative force and before consumer
law had become an accepted concept to modify or supplement
commercial law. 9 Today, in contrast, consideration of consumer
issues is necessary in conjunction with any revision of commer-
cial law; not to do so is a guarantee of difficulty in enactment
and, equally important, is a failure to adequately consider what
is desirable for a fair and balanced legal regime.2 ° Thus, as the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) move forward
to revise Article 2 of the U.C.C., 21 they must address consumer
which seems to be legislation that no one, except certain members of Congress and
several interest groups, seemed to want.
17. The Magnuson-Moss Act is the major federal intrusion on the subject. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988). The Act preempts limited aspects of the law of sales
such as limiting warranty disclaimers, id. § 2308, but for the most part, it supple-
ments sales law, adding disclosure requirements, id. § 2303, and addressing forms of
what may be viewed as deceptive warranty practices, id. § 2304.
18. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for
the New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 551
(1993); Miller, Karl's Kode, supra note 11, at 705-06; Warren, supra note 8, at 815-
16.
19. Warren, supra note 8, at 819. U.C.C. Article 2 in its present form contains
only one provision with an express consumer law rule, § 2-719(3), which provides
that in the case of consumer goods a limitation of consequential damages for person-
al injuries is prima facie unconscionable. Of course, the merchant standard of § 2-
104(1) and § 2-104(3) operates to create higher duties on such persons that may
benefit consumers as in § 2-209(2), for example. For the most part, however, any
consumer protection for buyers is afforded outside of and not within Article 2. See
U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990) (leaving unimpaired statutes regulating sales to consumers);
Miller, supra note 1, at 957 (discussing the limited consumer protection provisions in
Article 2A).
20. This broader process was followed in the creation or revision of U.C.C. Articles
2A, 3, and 4. Of course, it is debatable how far consumer protections should extend.
See, e.g., Gall Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REv. 679 (1991); Rubin, supra note 16.
21. The first step in the Article 2 revision process was a study completed under
the auspices of the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB). See PEB Study Group: Uni-
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issues. The problem arises because this must be accomplished,
at least in part, in a forum (state law) that in the past has prov-
en inhospitable to a successful resolution of these matters. The
drafters need a principled approach to deal with this dilemma.
At the same time, the approach must contain a formula afford-
ing a reasonable chance for success.
II. DESIGNING A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
A. Possible Alternatives
Under the above standard, several possible approaches can be
rejected quite easily. One unacceptable plan would leave con-
sumer issues in Article 2 in their current form. As pointed out
above, virtually no provisions in present Article 2 address con-
sumer issues,22 and this approach would continue to leave the
protection of consumer interests to the development of law out-
side the CodeY A safe prediction is that consumer groups
would rather use the leverage that could accrue from their par-
ticipation in the revision of Article 2 to obtain further provisions
addressing consumer issues than accept the task of designing
and attempting the enactment of separate consumer legislation
on their own. Accordingly, consumer groups likely will oppose
this approach. Moreover, such an approach would assure
nonuniformity, as a considerable number of nonuniform amend-
ments to Article 2 now exist,' and consumer groups certainly
would not accept the repeal of these modifications. A final disad-
form Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW. 1869 (1991).
Upon receipt of the study report, the two sponsoring organizations, the NCCUSL
and the ALI, formed a drafting committee to rewrite Article 2. The chair is Law-
rence J. Bugge, a past president of the NCCUSL. The Reporter is Richard E.
.Speidel, Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law,
and chair of the Article 2 Study Group. The Reporter for technology issues is Ray-
mond T. Nimmer, Leonard Childs Professor of Law, and now Acting Dean, Universi-
ty of Houston Law School. The Drafting Committee is assisted by advisors and ob-
servers from interested constituencies, including consumer representatives. A more
detailed description of the process appears in Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 MERCER L. REv. 799 (1992).
22. See supra note 19.
23. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
24. See [State U.C.C. Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) (listing nonuniform
state amendments throughout).
1994] 1571
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1565
vantage of this approach is that Article 2 would continue to
apply rules designed for commercial transactions to consumer
transactions, and thus motivate courts to interpret the rules in a
way which can only cause questions when the interpretation is
applied in commercial cases.
A second approach would eliminate the last two problems by
simply carving consumer transactions out of Article 2 entire-
ly-leaving it as a solely commercial article. However, this could
not eliminate the initial difficulty with the first approach: that
of securing consumer support or neutrality for revised Article 2.
Without any quid pro quo in the way of support for the devel-
opment of separate appropriate consumer rules, reciprocal accep-
tance of a revised Article 2 by consumer groups is unlikely.
Moreover, this approach would place a great deal of pressure on
drawing the line between a consumer and a commercial transac-
tion in revised Article 2. Finally, it would leave consumer sales
transactions, at least for the foreseeable future, to an uncertain
body of law.26 The law governing consumer transactions might
consist of codifications of older contract law27 or common law
that, even if the Restatement28 were commonly followed, still
would involve significantly more uncertainty than rules in the
Code. Accordingly, any new rules would have to be developed
without broad support and in an inappropriate forum."
This last objection perhaps could be addressed by turning to a
forum which has proven more hospitable for the development of
consumer law. Thus, a third approach might be to combine the
first or second approach with the development of related con-
sumer laws in Congress. 0 A major difficulty with this plan,
however, is that no procedure exists for coordinating the devel-
opment of state law with the development of federal law.3
25. See Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty
Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1015 n.6 (1993).
26. See, e.g., id.
27. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 (1981).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).
29. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
31. See Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative Process and
Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 48 Bus. LAW. 437 (1993).
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Whereas the creation of a procedure might be desirable, to do so
while also developing coordinated consumer law would involve
accomplishing two major efforts at the same time, thus substan-
tially reducing the probability of a successful effort. Moreover, it
is open to serious question whether such a procedure would be
acceptable to many interested parties who could have significant
concerns both about the soundness of the procedure and the
quality of the legislative package that the procedure might pro-
duce.32
A final approach that probably has no greater chance of accep-
tance is to insert substantial consumer rules into the revision of
Article 2. This plan would alleviate all of the problems with the
approaches suggested earlier, but clearly conflicts with the past
experience of state consumer law efforts, which suggests that
this forum "is not the approach to enhanced consumer protec-
tion."33 Moreover, to the extent that consumer law statutes and
decisions already exist in a given jurisdiction as a result of the
previous approach, this plan would either upset balances long
struck or result in a lack of uniformity if those balances were
maintained.34
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. Warren, supra note 8, at 816. In the past, however, consumer representatives
and persons representing the interests of providers of goods, services, and other
products, did not discuss these issues extensively with each other during the draft-
ing process. However, there was far more advocacy or discussion of consumer views
than some writers have surmised or admitted. Compare id. at 819-22 (discussing the
incidents of consumer activism during the drafting of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4) with
Rubin, supra note 16, at 755 (noting that "the task of pointing out the potential dif-
ficulties for consumers fell largely on law professors"). True joinder on many issues,
however, never occurred due to the historical approach of the Code, past experience
with consumer issues, and other factors. The revision of Article 2, however, is
blessed with not only a new concentration on consumer issues because of past diffi-
culties but additionally involves persons on the Drafting Committee with consider-
able consumer law experience and several advisors or observers that represent con-
sumer interests in their work. To date, this has given rise to strong discussion and
a much improved atmosphere for reaching consensus.
34. There has been some experience of this sort-even with the much more mod-
est inclusion of consumer provisions within Article 2A. Another reason suggesting
that this alternative is not appropriate lies in the nature of consumer law in com-
parison to commercial law. The latter, unlike the former, relies heavily on freedom
of contract and private enforcement without sanctions and promotes the efficiency
and benefit of the system as opposed to the interests of a particular class. Fred H.
Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A- A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV.
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B. A Roadmap to Follow
These observations nonetheless would seem to point the way
toward a principled approach with a reasonable chance for suc-
cess. That approach not only gains validity as a result of the
analysis and rejection of the alternative approaches previously
mentioned, but also has some history by which to judge accep-
tance because it was implemented in Articles 2A, 3, and 4.35
The suggested approach is to: (1) retain both special consumer
rules and the rules that treat merchants differently,"6 (2) retain
or add sufficient protections so that traditional Code principles
of freedom of contract and assumptions like the ability to bar-
gain over terms do not result in undue disadvantage or abuse to
consumers, 7 (3) add any provisions on which a broad consensus
405, 413-15 (1991).
35. See generally Miller, supra note 1; Miller, supra note 34. Unlike Article 2A,
explicit consumer provisions do not exist in Articles 3 and 4, but a number of provi-
sions essentially favor consumers. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 3 prefatory note (Benefits to
Users). As of December 1993, Article 2A has been enacted in 40 jurisdictions, [State
U.C.C Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) xiii-xiv (Dec. 1993), and Articles 3
and 4 in 31 jurisdictions, id. at xix-xx, so the plan evidences some chance of suc-
cess.
36. In Article 2, these would include § 2-719(3) (making prima facie unconsciona-
ble the limitation of consequential damages, for injury to the person, in consumer
goods transactions) and the merchant differentiations in § 2-103(1)(b) (good faith),
§ 2-201(2) (statute of frauds), § 2-205 (firm offers), § 2-207(2) (additional terms in
acceptance), § 2-209(2) (agreements restricting modification), § 2-314(1) (implied war-
ranty of merchantability), § 2-509(3) (risk of loss), § 2-603 (rightfully rejected goods),
and § 2-609(2) (assurance of performance). Although they may not go far enough
today, § 2-302 (unconscionability), § 2-316 (restriction of disclaimers), and § 2-318
(third-party beneficiaries of warranties) can be considered consumer rules as well.
Retaining these sections is not an absolute mandate; amendment and even deletion
may be in order in some instances. For example, consumer representatives have
expressed skepticism over whether the separate signature requirement of § 2-209(2)
does more harm than good. Perhaps the ability to create a private statute of frauds
authorized by § 2-209(2) should be withdrawn entirely for consumer transactions. It
seems unlikely that the door thus would be opened to much fraud, particularly if §
2-201 were deleted. Furthermore, the unfair surprise to consumers from a private
statute of limitations clause that the separate signature requirement of § 2-209(2)
seeks, perhaps ineffectually, to prevent, would be eliminated.
37. In Article 2, this would include § 2-103(1)(b) (defining merchant good faith), §
2-302 (unconscionability), the other restrictions on agreement in § 1-102(3), the re-
quirement of good faith in § 1-203, restrictions on disclaimers in § 2-316, and reme-
dies in §§ 2-718 and 2-719. Additions to consider would include the expanded uncon-
scionability provisions of § 2A-108 and some limitation on the ability of the parol
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has arisen since the Code was first adopted and which would
otherwise conflict with provisions in the Code, 8 and (4) defer to
evidence rule of § 2-202 to exclude representations on which the consumer may
reasonably have relied or, alternatively, an affirmative disclosure concerning the pos-
sible impact of the parol evidence rule akin to the Federal Trade Commission "Used
Car Rule" requirements, 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (1993). See also infra text accompanying
notes 40-105 (discussing other possible additions). However, any provision that would
benefit consumers, or any other class of persons, at the expense of efficiency in the
system, and thus at the expense of all of the other parties participating in the sys-
tem, should be adopted only in rare circumstances. Cf Miller, supra note 34, at 414-
16 (discussing efficiency considerations in Articles 3, 4, and 4A). An example might
be a rule that would preserve the statute of frauds for all contracts because of con-
cern over the opportunity for fraud in consumer contracts and in the belief that
consumers could not protect themselves adequately against false allegations.
38. Such an approach might result in limitations on choice of law and forum, such
as those found in U.C.C. § 2A-106 (for which an exception must be made in U.C.C.
§ 1-105), provisions compatible with the Magnuson-Moss Act on preclusion of dis-
claimers, compare 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1988) (forbidding disclaimer of implied war-
ranties) with U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990) (allowing parties, pursuant to certain require-
ments, to disclaim implied warranties), and abrogation of any privity requirement for
written warranties, compare CURTIS R. REITz, CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES UN-
DER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS § 8.02 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the provisions of fed-
eral law) with U.C.C. § 2-318 (1990) (partially eliminating, depending on the alterna-
tive chosen, traditional privity requirements). Perhaps additional coordination as to
remedy provisions for full and other warranties also must be considered. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(3) (1988) (extending period of warranty for repair attempts under
the Magnuson-Moss Act) with U.C.C. § 2-725 (1990) and infra note 71 (no explicit
tolling of statute of limitations); compare also 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1988) (describing
minimum warranty protections which the warrantor must accept) with U.C.C. § 2-
719 (1990) (allowing parties to alter by contract the U.C.C.'s remedy provisions).
However, additional provisions, such as extensive disclosure requirements, presum-
ably would not be added, even though doing so might enhance enforcement, as the
Code is not a regulatory statute. See Miller, supra note 34, at 413; see also UNIF.
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE prefatory note, 7A U.LA. 1 (1985) (1974 Act) (Federal Pre-
emption of Disclosure).
However, careful consideration must be given to any coordination with the
Magnuson-Moss provisions. First, one should consider whether the coordination
should extend beyond "written warranties," 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1988), to "express
warranties," U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990), or whether Magnuson-Moss' limited goal of only
preventing deception in connection with written warranties by these limiting provi-
sions as to disclaimer and privity will be maintained. Arguably, express warranties
beyond written warranties do not involve the same possibility for deception, and it
might be inadvisable in any event to extend some Magnuson-Moss provisions, such
as the provision disallowing a limitation on duration, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1988),
beyond what is mandated for coordination with the federal law. Compare U.C.C. §§
2-725(1), 2-719 (1990) (detailing the ability of parties to alter by contract remedies
and to shorten the U.C.C.'s statute of limitations) with 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1988);
see also REITZ, supra, § 7.03. Second, full coordination with the Magnuson-Moss Act
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and perhaps even suggest development of other law outside the
Code which may provide additional protection to designated
classes of persons or transactions.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. Additional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
The key to a successful implementation of the suggested ap-
proach is to identify what additional protective provisions should
be added to Article 2 to satisfy consumer concerns without de-
stroying a broad consensus in support of the approach or materi-
ally affecting the principle that the Code, and in particular Arti-
cle 2, is not a regulatory statute. Initially, the details of this
approach could be effected by a decision to implement improved
or alternative dispute resolution provisions in Article 2. Clearly
a major problem in the acceptability of the present Article 2 ap-
proach for consumers is the lack of incentive in the statute and
the absence of resources outside of the statute to enforce or
contest contracts under the statute. As the Code is not regulato-
ry, no state agency enforces it as an alternative.
One solution would be to provide a minimum remedy, includ-
ing recovery of attorney's fees and costs.4" If the litigation expe-
would require adopting the concept of a "consumer product," 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1)
(1988), rather than "consumer goods," U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1990). Discerning what is a
"consumer product" is difficult in many cases, and adoption of the concept for the
purpose of the application of a broad range of substantive rules could create a great
deal of uncertainty in commercial law, where certainty is a positive goal. Finally,
Magnuson-Moss is or may be implemented to some degree by regulatory material.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(3), 2304(b)(2)-(3) (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 700 (1993).
Whereas this regulatory material, or its absence, has been quite static, it need not
be, and the fact that it can be modified in a much more flexible manner than can a
statute enacted in multiple jurisdictions poses obvious drafting difficulties, without
obvious solutions. Cf UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.201, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985)
(1974 Act) (incorporating federal law by reference); id. prefatory note (Federal Pre-
emption of Disclosure) (discussing constitutional issues). This problem also arises
between U.C.C. Article 4 and Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1993). See Rubin,
supra note 16, at 773-81; Warren, supra note 8, at 816-19.
39. The Code commonly defers to other law on consumer protection issues. See,
e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2A-104, 3-302(g) (1990). It also, on occasion, has specifically
suggested appropriate topics for additional legislation to supplement its rules. See id.
§ 4-101 cmt. 3.
40. Often, this remedy structure is expressly included in the agreement for the
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rience that has occurred under certain federal acts4' were to re-
sult, however, this cure could be fatal to the nature of the
Code.42 The necessary statutory sanctions for violations could
produce debilitating rigidity and lack of flexibility. 3 At the
same time, however, other federal and state statutes, arguably
similarly structured,44 have not produced these same effects,
and the nature and context of the asserted violation may be
more important than the remedy.45 Moreover, the drafters
could segregate consumer and commercial rules so that whatev-
er rigidity and inflexibility did result from effective provisions to
enforce consumer rules would not impair the commercial opera-
tion of the statute. Arguably, any deleterious effect on the con-
sumer side is simply the price of the benefits gained that might
be paid in any event.46
nonconsumer side of the transaction, which usually prepares the written contract.
See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1990) (allowing provisions for the liquidation or limitation of
damages). Consumer statutes frequently limit the ability of the nonconsumer side to
so contract. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.507, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (1974
Act). Consumer-type statutes also often provide the balance for which consumers are
unable to negotiate. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1988) (allowing consumers to recover
fees); U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) (1990) (same).
41. The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), before
its simplification, resulted in an avalanche of litigation and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, id. § 1692, continues to be heavily litigated. See THE LAW OF TRUTH
IN LENDING 1.02, 12.01 (Ralph J. Rohner ed., 1984); Griffith L. Garwood et al.,
Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 777, 794 (1993).
42. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1990); supra note 34.
43. Miller, supra note 34, at 413.
44. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1988). Nor has
there been substantial litigation under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301
(1988), or U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990). For a discussion of the Magnuson-Moss provision,
see RErrz, supra note 38, § 10.02.
45. The litigation under the prior Truth in Lending Act and under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act involved contests over detailed form disclosures in default
situations. See, e.g., Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, 1992 Update on the Federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 47 BUs. LAW. 1309 (1992); Miller, Truth in Lend-
ing, supra note 11. In contrast, where proof of violation is more difficult because the
questions raised in the asserted violation involve factors that are not so concrete,
and where the dispute involves a substantive complaint rather than a mere technical
defense to a clear default, the litigation may be viewed as being limited to more
meritorious cases. In any event, no known evidence clearly shows that allowing re-
covery of at least attorney's fees and costs for consumers in Code actions would
prompt undue litigation. Some evidence suggests otherwise. See, eg., UNIF. CONSUM-
ER CREDIT CODE § 5.108, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (1974 Act); infra note 46.
46. Presumably the same effect would stem from any separate consumer legisla-
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Another alternative route would be to build into Article 2
encouragement for private dispute resolution procedures that
would more easily allow consumers to raise and obtain adjust-
ment of claims without expensive litigation. The Magnuson-Moss
Act contains such provisions47 that could be written into Article
2 in modified form and presumably plugged into the federal
structure of approved procedures, or into an existing or newly
created state agency structure operated by a consumer protec-
tion agency or a division of the state attorney general's office.
Other possibilities might include encouragement of arbitra-
481tion48 or a state operated ombudsman's office.49
B. Substantive Areas of Consumer Concern
However, assuming the dispute resolution structure of Article
2 remains essentially unchanged, or that any changes in the
manner of resolving Article 2 disputes do not significantly affect
the nature or extent of changes to substantive provisions, what
additional protective changes might be considered within the
suggested approach and guidelines stated previously?" For dis-
cussion, the possible changes can be grouped into three distinct
areas: (1) property interests, (2) warranty, and (3) breach and
remedies.
tion supplementary to the Code. Moreover, experience in this area has not demon-
strated that a deleterious effect necessarily would follow. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 936 (West 1988) (allowing recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party in
a civil action on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (1988); see also 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1993). For a discus-
sion, see REITE, supra note 38, ch. 11. Professor Reitz indicates that there has been
less than full utilization of the Magnuson-Moss structure to date, but with the in-
creased emphasis on alternative dispute resolution, that picture may change.
48. The use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is increasing. Commen-
tators have mixed views on this development. See Edward C. Anderson, Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Finance Contracts, 45 CoNs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 373
(1991); ITT Consumer Financial Corp.'s Loan Collection/Arbitration Program
Unconscionable, 11 NCLC REPORTS: DEBT COLLECTION & REPOSSESSION ED. 17
(1993).
49. For a discussion of this type of procedure in another consumer context, see
Griffith L. Garwood, Fresh Approach to Consumer Protection Would Lift Some of
Regulatory Burden, AM. BANKER, Apr. 28, 1993, at 4.




Several obvious changes clearly would result in the improve-
ment of consumer protection with regard to property interests,
and several other possibilities deserve consideration. The obvi-
ous provisions are (1) an exception for consumer consignors to
the rule that consignors lose to creditors of the consignee absent
the filing of a financing statement or other form of notice;5' (2)
a clarification of when a voidable title under U.C.C. section 2-
403(1) becomes a void title due to action of the person entitled to
rescind the sale, which action may be entirely unknowable by a
bona fide consumer purchaser;52 and (3) a rule that a person
entrusted with goods has the ability under the shelter principle
to pass the power conferred by entrustment to a transferee, who
is then able to pass that interest to a consumer buyer in the
ordinary course of business.53
One possible provision that is less obvious and deserves fur-
ther analysis is one that would allow greater latitude for con-
sumer buyers who have paid all or part of the purchase price to
obtain goods identified in their contracts.'M Such buyers are not
51. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1990). See generally John Dolan, The UCC's Consignment
Rule Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44 OHio ST. L.J. 21 (1983).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1990); Car & Universal Fin. Co. v. Caldwell, [1965] 1
Q.B. 525 (holding that when a buyer absconds, any overt means falling short of
communication or repossession is sufficient to evince an intention to hold the con-
tract void); cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 234 N.E.2d 230
(N.Y. 1967) (holding that a stockbroker must show the exercise of reasonable com-
mercial diligence to learn essential facts of a transaction in order to qualify as a
bona fide purchaser).
53. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1990); see also Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App.
Div. 1979), affd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y.' 1981); Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Warren F.
Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REV. 50 (1981).
Consideration of extending further protection to consumer buyers against stolen,
as opposed to entrusted, goods under an adaptation of the English doctrine of "mar-
ket-overt" may well be in order, particularly if many used goods dealers, such as
pawnbrokers, are otherwise regulated so as not to allow too much opportunity for
thieves to cleanse stolen titles. Along the same lines, a consumer buyer who ac-
quires goods from a dealer who acquired the goods subject to a security interest
might be protected beyond the protection in U.C.C. § 9-307 and the interpretation of
U.C.C. § 2-403 in Executive Financial Services, Inc. v. Pagel, 715 P.2d 381 (Kan.
1986). This approach would internalize losses from dishonest debtors and careless
dealers while protecting secured parties from loss resulting from fraud.
54. U.C.C. §§ 2-502 and 2-716 afford very limited remedies to buyers on the
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always sophisticated enough to protect themselves by bargaining
for, obtaining, and perfecting a security interest to secure the
seller's obligation55 and, if necessary, a subordination agree-
ment. Moreover, the preference that would result from greater
protection would not appear to be significant or different in kind
from that suggested in U.C.C. section 2-326(3).
A second matter for consideration is whether consumer buyers
should have unwaivable protection from risk of loss until receipt
of the goods. This is the basic statutory rule when the seller is a
merchant,56 but it does not apply in a shipment contract57 or
when the risk of loss is allocated by agreement.58 It would ap-
pear that sellers are better able to process claims against carri-
ers and are in a better position to know whether the goods were
delivered or damaged. It also seems unlikely that consumer
buyers will notice risk-shifting agreements or procure insurance
prior to delivery of the goods. Thus, unwaivable protection may
make sense.
2. Warranties
The warranty area, even beyond the suggested coordination
with the protections Magnuson-Moss affords, is an area ripe for
the consideration of additional or modified consumer provisions.
The proposals that clearly deserve consideration are (1) clarify-
ing the coverage of express warranty to extend to manufacturers'
whole. Cf Proyectos Electronicos, S.A. v. Alper, 37 B.R. 931 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
Even if the matter can be controlled by contract, see, e.g., R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v.
Ferguson, 214 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. 1975); Martin v. Sheffer, 403 S.E.2d 555 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991), a consumer buyer is unlikely to so contract.
55. Nonetheless, the Article 2 Study Group suggests that the matter be left to
Article 9. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT
132-33 (1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]. Of course, this does not necessarily
mean that the protection must be a regular security interest. Id. However, the Arti-
cle 9 Study Group report seems to focus solely on the commercial context. See PER-
MANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 194-98 (1992). Article 2 seems the
appropriate place to provide limited protection in the consumer area which is not de-
pendent on a security interest.
56. U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (1990).
57. See id. § 2-509(1)(a).
58. See id. § 2-509(4).
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warranties given to consumer buyers which presently may not
fit clearly within the U.C.C. section 2-313 definition;59 (2) pre-
cluding disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer sales of
new and non-second goods; (3) clarifying limitations of lia-
bility for breach of warranty, including liquidated damages pro-
visions, to require a fair minimum remedy under the reasonably
foreseeable circumstances,61 to recognize a differentiation be-
59. The U.C.C. defines an express warranty as an "affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain." U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1990); see also American Bar Ass'n Task
Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1002-09, 1103-05
(1991). Absent inclusion under Article 2, contract law may govern the status of such
warranties and, even if the rule is appropriate, may still result in solutions with
unwarranted differences from the rules of Article 2 for express warranties. A related
issue that is not as easy to resolve is whether there needs to be reliance on, or at
least knowledge of, an express warranty, such as when the buyer finds the warranty
agreement in the glove compartment after delivery. Compare Cuthbertson v. Clark
Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315, 321 (Me. 1982) (holding that affirmations in the owner's
manual not relied upon by the purchaser were not part of the basis of the bargain)
with Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(finding that a statement in the seller's sales catalogue known to the buyer was an
affirmation of fact which was part of the basis of the bargain) and Hawkins Constr.
Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (Neb. 1973) (holding that a pamphlet
statement constituted an express warranty even absent reliance), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39, 43
(Neb. 1983). Arguably, one additional plaintiff should make little difference to a sell-
er who intends to induce a broad class by the disputed representation. However,
enforcement of an express warranty which never was relied upon as the basis of the
bargain creates difficult issues in other contexts, see, e.g., Hellman v. Kirschner, 191
N.Y.S. 202, 203-04 (App. Div. 1921), and seems to strike at the very heart of why
such warranties are enforced.
60. See Clifford, supra note 25, at 1100-03. Variations on this approach may be
debated, such as extending the ban to all goods absent a clearly known and compen-
sated choice between acquiring the goods under warranty and acquiring them "as is."
A statutory scheme also could preclude warranty disclaimers but allow warranties to
be subject to time limitations.
61. See U.C.C. §§ 2-719 cmt. 1, 2A-503(2) (1990). Repair or replacement is often a
fair minimum remedy. However, where new goods are seriously defective, a refund
or other monetary relief may be necessary. See, e.g., Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d
770 (8th Cir. 1982); Kusens v. Bodyguard Rustproofing Co., 23 Ohio Op. 3d 440
(Ohio Ct. App. 1980). In other cases, recovery of consequential damages may be
necessary, such as when a defect in an automobile causes a fire which destroys the
automobile and other property. See Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294
F. Supp. 649, 655-56 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 465 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Ark. 1971); A & M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119-20 (Ct. App. 1982); Durham v.
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tween commercial and consumer transactions as to the amount
of restitution to be made to the buyer,62 and to classify limita-
tion of liability clauses as subject to the liquidated damages
test;3 and (4) changing the statute of limitations for warranty
in a consumer sale to adopt as a general rule a breach and dis-
covery point for accrual of the statutory period.' This last
change would obviate the legions of cases in which a buyer
strains to characterize the warranty as extending to future per-
formance,65 including the clearly unfair results that occur
when, for example, a painting is discovered to be a forgery too
late,6 goods are found to be stolen,67 or a latent defect later
causes injury.6 While the policies behind the present rule are
salutary,69 modification of the rule in the interests of justice
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 700-01 (S.D. 1982). A total ban on exclusion of
personal injury damages in consumer transactions also would change case results
very little, if any. See, e.g., Collins v. Uniroyal, 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974). See gener-
ally Clifford, supra note 25, at 1103-06.
62. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-504(3)(b) (1990) with id. § 2-718(2)(b).
63. See, e.g., Simpson v. Phone Directories Co., 729 P.2d 578, 581 (Or. Ct. App.
1986). This would prevent the result reached in Fretwell v. Protection Alarm Co.,
764 P.2d 149 (Okla. 1988), and other cases such as Fireman's Fund American Insur-
ance Co. v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131 (Il. App. Ct.
1980) (upholding a low damage limitations clause in a contract for a security system
where the failure of the system resulted in foreseeable and substantial losses). Alter-
natively, the cases could be handled under a clarified U.C.C. § 2-719. See supra note
61; cf Kusens, 23 Ohio Op. 3d 440 (holding that a limitation of damages to "repair
or refund" was illusory because the purchaser gets no benefit whatsoever from the
warranty and damage limitation).
64. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-506(2) (1990).
65. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823 (8th
Cir. 1983); Ocean Springs Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 662 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981);
Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1094, 1097-99 (D. Del. 1983); Wright
v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 358 So. 2d 444, 445 (Ala. 1978); Kodiak Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v.
DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 156-57 (Alaska 1984); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Celotex Corp., 574 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Ark. 1978); Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675
P.2d 333, 335 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 315 N.E.2d
580, 583-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
66. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1988); Rosen
v. Spanierman, 711 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds,
894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990); cf Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990).
67. See, e.g., Weaver v. Casey, 816 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1991) (illustrating but not
discussing the problem).
68. See, e.g., Anderson v. Deere & Co., 622 F. Supp. 290 (D. Colo. 1985); Cutler-
Hammer, 358 So. 2d 444.
69. According to the comment to U.C.C. § 2-725, the statutory period accords with
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would not upset the overall spirit of Article 2.70 A related
change would provide clarity and perhaps a better answer to the
question of when the statute of limitations begins to run when
the seller has given an express warranty promising repair or
replacement, and fails to perform adequately.7'
One final matter that needs consideration in this area is the
requirement of privity. Any law outside the Code72 that re-
quires vertical or horizontal privity7" with respect to the ulti-
mate consumer or user74 should be abrogated by U.C.C. section
the normal commercial record keeping period. Of course, the other policy mentioned
in the comment, a uniform statutory period, would be preserved. See U.C.C. § 2-725
cmt. (1990).
70. The different rule in U.C.C. § 2A-506 has engendered virtually no discussion
in the enactment process. Forty jurisdictions have adopted Article 2A as of August
1993. As exposure in the case of a lease is limited by its term, however, the two
contexts are not completely parallel. For a related issue, see infra note 71 and ac-
companying text.
71. See, e.g., Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seibels, Bruce & Co., 579 F. Supp. 135 (D.
Md. 1984) (holding that attempts to repair do not toll statute of limitations); Tittle
v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1989) (finding that
a buyer's cause of action under a repair or replacement warranty accrues on the
date of delivery and not upon the seller's refusal or failure to repair); Boyd v. A.O.
Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Thalrose
v. General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971)
(same), affd, 343 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div. 1973). But see City of Bedford v. James
Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1977) (declaring that repair efforts estopped
plea of statute of limitations); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 285 Cal.
Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a cause of action accrued when the buyer
determined that the seller was unable to repair a car).
In addition, to the extent that Article 2 restricts the ability to disclaim and
limit liability in the ultimate consumer transaction, and thus becomes more akin to
strict liability in tort, the Code limitation period may warrant a reduction as well.
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. Perhaps an ultimate point of repose
ought to be included, so as not to cause undue exposure to an unlimited liability.
Finally, a longer limitations period in which to sue a dealer should be coordinated
with the dealer's ability to recover from the dealer's seller, if such basis is not dis-
claimed or limited.
72. Warranty under the Code is an obligation imposed in certain sales transac-
tions and is not a matter of agreement. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316(1), 2-317(c) (1990). Priv-
ity of contract is not, therefore, an inherent requirement and must derive, if at all,
from other considerations.
73. Vertical privity involves the distributive chain. Horizontal privity involves
persons who come in contact with the goods while they are in the hands of the
buyer.
74. Several factors support an argument for maintaining a privity requirement for
other than the consumer. Parties have less experience with commercial transactions
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2-318 for all types of injuries, both personal and economic, to the
extent determined by the courts in cases decided either before or
after the enactment of revised Article 2.7 In short, the privity
requirement arose in non-U.C.C. case law,76 and should be
dealt with there as well. While this might extend consumer
rules beyond what is needed for coordination with the
Magnuson-Moss Act," it would not result in extending abroga-
tion beyond what courts have done in the area of strict liability
in tort,78 with which, as a practical matter, the Code must coex-
ist.7" Nor should it matter in reaching a decision on this issue
whether Article 2 may preclude disclaimers and restrict the
ability to limit remedy for breach in the ultimate consumer
transaction."0 In fairness, however, the statute should address
lacking privity because they are not covered under strict liability. The lack of privity
raises many difficult issues, such as the validity of remedy limitations on the
nonimmediate buyer. See generally REITZ, supra note 38, § 8.03. Arguably, these
matters need not be addressed as commercial parties are, on the whole, better able
than consumers to deal with the problems that support the argument in favor of the
relaxation of privity. However, a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
Some might also argue against abrogation of a privity requirement even for a
consumer where the consumer buys a brand name product from a retailer and the
manufacturer is unknown. Id. at 124. The likelihood of an attempt to circumvent the
retailer in such a case is remote, and why shouldn't the consumer who purchases a
drill manufactured by Black and Decker from a local dealer, for example, be able to
sue the manufacturer?
75. See U.C.C. § 2A-104(1)(c) (1990) (taking a similar approach in a different con-
text).
76. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
77. See supra note 38.
78. Nor would the result go beyond what many courts have done under present
U.C.C. § 2-318 case law, based on the invitations stated in comment 2 to § 2-313
and comment 3 to § 2-318. For an example of a case arising under Alternative A to
§ 2-318, see Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849
(Okla. 1979) (abrogating vertical privity in a case involving economic loss).
79. Compare Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980) with U.C.C. § 2A-
216 (1990). Before completely dismissing this issue, however, it might be productive
to consider having only one law to govern these issues-a revised Article 2. Such an
approach may make more sense than the current scheme, which includes Article 2,
case law on strict liability, and perhaps a separate products liability statute, particu-
larly since the doctrine of strict liability was created largely in response to legal
rules that even at the time were no longer fully applicable. See 3A WIJIM D.
HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
§ 2A-212:13 (1993). The report of the Article 2 Study Group was much more timid
on this issue, but it did address the matter. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
55, at 97-98.
80. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The defendant, for example, a
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the relationship between a manufacturer and a dealer, and, as
relevant, other parties in the distributive chain. Thus, if the
manufacturer by disclaimer or liability limitation has insulated
itself wholly or in part from suit by the dealer and it now must
respond to a suit by a consumer,8' the manufacturer arguably
should have a statutory cause of action against the dealer al-
though now the manufacturer will bear the risk of the dealer's
insolvency. Even if the manufacturer remains liable to the deal-
er in warranty, the statute ought to determine whether the
manufacturer should be able to recover the excess of what was
manufacturer, might not be subject to these limitations except as to the consumer
plaintiff. See infra note 81. Therefore, a manufacturer who does not warrant the
product directly to the consumer could be liable beyond its contract with a person
who is subject to these limitations, such as a dealer. Arguably, no concern is war-
ranted as to this matter because the issue is addressed in strict liability where dis-
claimers and other contractual limitations generally are not valid. See William J.
McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective? The
Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1975). To the extent the loss is econom-
ic, and thus perhaps beyond the purview of strict liability, the issue should be large-
ly inconsequential, as any amounts involved in the consumer context are likely to be
relatively small. Moreover, certainly policy should dictate that others in the distribu-
tive chain who are better able to bear or spread such losses should assume them,
rather than consumers. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1976). Nonetheless, merely because strict liability in tort leaves the chips to
fall where they may, or because the amounts involved in single cases are relatively
de minimis, is no reason not to provide a complete statutory structure.
81. Any disclaimer or limitation of liability that is valid against the dealer should
not be valid against the ultimate consumer. To hold otherwise would defeat the
unifying purpose of affording a consumer a remedy for a defective product by ban-
ning disclaimers, limiting the ability to unduly restrict liability, and abrogating privi-
ty. This policy would change the current explicit rule set forth in comment 1 to
U.C.C. § 2-318 and in U.C.C. § 2A-216, but that rule is not always observed now.
See, e.g., Karczewski v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ind. 1974), affd,
515 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1975); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d
49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750
(N.Y. 1973).
This approach seems superior to that of some statutes which extend the ban
against disclaimers and limitations to all levels. See Clifford, supra note 25, at 1103.
When the goods first enter distribution, an accurate prediction cannot always be
made as to whether the ultimate sale will be a consumer transaction. Moreover, the
approach of a general ban also prohibits the commercial parties from addressing the
matter by contract between themselves and thus it unnecessarily restricts a basic
Code tenet. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Whether the policy should be
different in commercial transactions is beyond the scope of this Article.
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paid to the consumer over what the manufacturer received from
the dealer, or some part of that amount."
3. Breach and Remedies
The final area where modified or additional consumer provi-
sions should be considered is that of breach and remedies. Argu-
ably, Article 2 should deal more comprehensively with what
constitutes a breach by a buyer, 3 and regulate the freedom of a
seller to stipulate a remedy therefor to the extent such limita-
tions are fair. In that regard, limitation of the seller's ability to
accelerate installment debt and to invoke remedies for a first
time failure to make payment promptly would appear to meet
this fairness test.' Limitations on prohibiting the transfer of
an interest in the purchased property in a credit sale or making
the transfer a breach also might survive under the fairness stan-
dard.8"
Assuming a breach by the seller, 6 clarification of the type of
notice that a consumer must give and to whom is crucial. On the
82. Other issues still exist. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 109-14
(discussing the privity requirement with respect to third party beneficiaries of war-
ranties). That the dealer may not be able to sue the manufacturer is no different
than the case now if the dealer's contract with the manufacturer contains a valid
disclaimer and the dealer is liable in strict liability in tort.
83. U.C.C. § 2-703 currently lists four types of breach by a buyer: (1) wrongful
rejection; (2) wrongful revocation of acceptance; (3) failure to make a payment due
on or before delivery; and (4) repudiation. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1990). Certainly some
contracts add other possibilities. If related to secured credit, such matters may be
covered by Article 9. See id. § 9-501(1). Many matters also may relate to collateral
or ancillary obligations which Article 2 does not govern. See id § 2-701. Additional-
ly, Article 2 already provides some regulation of contracts that are not performed by
accepting delivery and making payment at one time. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-306, 2-612.
What may be left in the consumer context may not be of great significance, although
unsecured credit remains an area of concern. Cf id. § 2A-501(1) (default procedures);
id. § 2A-523 (lessor's remedies).
84. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.109-5.111, 7A U.L.A 1 (1985) (1974
Act). Additional research is needed to determine if enough states have similar laws
and whether enough contracts provide a similar scheme, absent a law compelling
them, to make uniformity desirable on this topic.
85. This topic might be regulated substantively as was done in the real estate
area, see 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§
5.21-.26 (2d ed. 1985), or merely subjected to disclosure requirements, see U.C.C. §
2A-303(8) (1990).
86. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1990).
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latter point, whether a consumer must notify a person with
whom the consumer is not in privity of breach is unclear both as
to rule8 7 and policy.' While the Code provides some guidance
for what notice of revocation and notice of breach under U.C.C.
section 2-607(3)(a) must contain, 9 none exists as to notice of
rejection. The Code should provide more concrete guidance as to
the content of notices to be given by consumers, perhaps by sug-
gested language in a comment and further specificity as to tim-
ing and other matters also would be helpful.9 °
87. Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-607 seems to go both ways, and literally the statute
only requires notice from a "buyer" to the "seller." Id. § 2-607 cmt. 5; cf id. § 2A-
516(3)(a) (requiring notice to the lessor and to the supplier, if any); see also
Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (holding that a
manufacturer was a seller only as to the retailer and not as to purchasers, who
thus were not required to give notice); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d
460 (Md. 1976) (same).
88. Three policies support requiring notice of breach: notice evidences a good faith
claim, allows negotiation, and allows adjustment. The first two are relevant in this
context, but the last is not, at least not directly. Because there is likely to be other
evidence of a valid claim in serious consumer claims-and one usually negotiates
more seriously after suit is instituted-on balance the notice requirement in this
context, at least as a bar rather than a basis for recovery of any provable detri-
ment, is unwarranted in consumer transactions. Indeed, because the above is true
even where the seller and the buyer have contracted with each other-and a seller
can cure or otherwise adjust after suit is instituted even though damages may have
increased by that time, given that an exasperated consumer buyer is quite likely not
to communicate with a seller until the time when the seller demands payment-the
notice requirement as a condition to any remedy probably should be eliminated in
all consumer cases. See Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983); see also
Fischer v. Mead Johnson Labs., 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (App. Div. 1973); cf PERMANENT
EDrIORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT NO. 3, at 47-48
(1967).
A related point is the requirement in U.C.C. § 2-717 that a buyer notify a
seller in order to withhold damages. While the seller's need to know is clear, the
right ought not to be lost because notification was not given. The seller will demand
payment and can be given notice then.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990); id. § 2-608 cmt. 5. See also § 2-605(1)(a),
which is likely to cut even more sharply in a consumer case than in a commercial
case. See, e.g., Industrial Fiberglass v. Jandt, 361 N.W.2d 595 (N.D. 1985) (barring a
commercial buyer from recovery absent notice of specific defects which were not
cured in a timely manner).
90. Clearly, the drafters of the U.C.C. generally intended a loose test. For exam-
ple, notice of breach is sufficient when "the content of the notification . . . let[s] the
seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched." U.C.C. §
2-607 cmt. 4 (1990). However, although not expressly forbidden by the U.C.C., oral
or equivocal notices have not fared well in the courts. See, e.g., Oda Nursery v.
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Assuming notice of breach is given, rejection may follow, ab-
sent an installment contract or a contract limitation, for virtual-
ly any deficiency."' This "perfect tender" rule puts the burden
on the seller, where it should reside in a consumer transaction.
However, just what constitutes an acceptance-which ends the
right to reject 92-- is unclear. In consumer cases, the seller may
argue that taking and using the goods before there is a reason-
able opportunity to inspect constitutes acceptance,93 or that ac-
ceptance occurs when the seller is attempting to remedy defi-
ciencies in the goods, although the buyer might not contemplate
that by allowing that process, as may be required under U.C.C.
section 2-508, the buyer may waive a substantial right.' The
Code should provide additional clarity not only as to this point,
but also as to when the seller has a right to overrule rejection by
a tender of cure under U.C.C. section 2-508(2). In the consumer
context, for example, should a seller be able to cure a breach by
repairing a television set, or even by delivery of a new set?95 In
Garcia Tree Lawn Inc., 708 P.2d 1039 (N.M. 1985) (holding that a buyer's references
to "deterioration" of plants did not contain sufficient particularity). The content of
the revocation notice should inform the seller unequivocally that the buyer does not
wish to keep the goods. Furthermore, the notice should set forth the nonconformity
in the goods that materially impairs their value to the buyer, in order to be in good
faith, prevent unfair surprise, and permit reasonable adjustment. U.C.C. § 2-608
cmt. 5 (1990).
Concerning the rejection notice, four factors are relevant: (1) the difficulty of
discovering the defect; (2) the terms of the contract; (3) the relative perishability of
the good; and (4) the course of performance after the sale and before the formal
rejection. See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 361-64, 374-75, 484-85 (3d ed. 1988).
91. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990).
92. Id. § 2-607(2).
93. See, e.g., Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 554 P.2d 349 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976). Compare U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a) (1990) and id. § 2-606(1)(b) with § 2-
606(1)(c).
94. See, e.g., McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio
1983) (assuming the acceptance occurred in the course of seller's repair attempts);
Sarnecki v. Al Johns Pontiac, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1121 (Pa. C.P. 1966)
(buyer's attorney apparently made same assumption). In these cases, the defects
were serious enough to allow later revocation, but that may not always be true. A
better analysis is that in Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
95. Compare Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that
the seller was entitled to attempt to repair defective goods) with Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. 1968) (holding that the seller was not entitled to
attempt cure because the defective automobile substantially impaired the buyer's
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the consumer context, arguably some issues deserve different
treatment even if the above efforts would constitute acceptable
commercial cures.
The buyer still may have a right to revoke acceptance even
after acceptance has occurred." In the consumer context, the
issues in this situation are both more numerous and more diffi-
cult to resolve than in the commercial context. Such issues in-
clude: (1) what is the standard for substantial impairment;97 (2)
what, if any, use may the buyer make of the goods after revoca-
tion;" (3) is revocation possible if alterations have been
made;99 (4) is a seller entitled to compensation for any allowed
faith in the good).
96. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1990).
97. See, e.g., McCullough, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (illustrating that shaken faith and un-
dermined confidence in product is relevant); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262
N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (holding that a series of annoying difficulties, although not
sufficient themselves, in combination constituted substantial impairment). The diffi-
cult case is one in which a very minor adjustment is all that is needed but the
performance of the goods before the adjustment is made suggests a serious defect.
See Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 224 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).
A proper test should consider whether a particular buyer is satisfied but should re-
quire adequate proof if unusual circumstances were involved. See, e.g., Colonial
Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 362 N.W.2d 704 (Mich. 1984) (finding that the failure to in-
clude a spare tire was a substantial impairment under the circumstances).
98. See, e.g., North River Homes, Inc. v. Bosarge, 594 So. 2d 1153 (Miss. 1992)
(holding that failure to move out of mobile home after revocation was not unreason-
able where the seller repeatedly assured the buyer that repair would be made);
McCullough, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (holding that continued use did not waive revocation
where the buyer was in no financial position to return automobile and obtain an-
other while awaiting the seller's acceptance of revocation). But see Cardwell, 423
A.2d 355 (stating that continuing monthly payments and using mobile home for
storage after moving out is reacceptance). A borderline but questionable case is Fiat
Auto U.S.A., Inc. v. Hollums, 363 S.E.2d 312 (Ga. 1987) (painting vehicle, paying
taxes and insurance, repairing it, and driving vehicle over 6000 miles constituted
reacceptance). Use of the goods to meet the buyer's duty to preserve them, see
U.C.C. § 2-602 (1990), or to protect the buyer's security interest, see id. § 2-711(3),
as might be the case where the goods are a mobile home, is not inconsistent with
revocation. See Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 545 P.2d 1382 (Or. 1976). But see Cardwell,
423 A.2d 355 (buyer's use exceeded these circumstances). These cases illustrate the
need for a case-by-case analysis. A buyer may continue to use the goods, depending
on the buyer's circumstances and whether or not the buyer is the breaching party; it
is unlikely, however, that a fiat rule will prove fair or feasible.
99. See, e.g., Stridiron v. I.C. Inc., 578 F. Supp. 997 (D.V.I. 1984) (permitting
tinted windows and stereo system); Village Mobile Homes v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting improvement of condition of mobile home). The
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use;' 0 and (5) how much use and time can expire before revo-
cation is no longer possible.'0 ' The latter issue is related to the
question of whether the Code should incorporate lemon laws
that now exist in most of the states. Those statutes provide a
much more concrete context for when and under what circum-
stances a buyer may have a remedy or be able to revoke accep-
tance in transactions involving major consumer purchases.' 2
Incorporating these laws certainly would benefit the industry be-
cause of the resulting uniformity, and would comport with the




No doubt some other changes could be added to those suggest-
ed so far. Indeed, two might be the inclusion of restrictions on
waivers of consumer rights0 4 and codification of those cases
that find a waiver or estoppel against the creditor in a pattern of
answer should not be a flat no, but should depend on the nature of the alteration.
See, e.g., Paige Steel Co. v. Great Northern Steel Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1368 (Pa. C.P. Bucks County 1987) (holding that by processing steel
coils, buyer substantially changed the goods).
100. The statute is silent on this matter. Most cases allow compensation, but there
are issues of proof, amount, and the like. See, e.g., In re Stem, 571 So. 2d 1112
(Ala. 1990); Page v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 599 So. 2d 38 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987);
Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1989); McCullough, 449
N.E.2d 1289; Johnson v. G.M. Corp., 668 P.2d 139 (Kan. 1983).
101. See Stridiron, 578 F. Supp. 997; Fitzgerald v. Don Darr Ford, Inc., 729 S.W.2d
256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Clearly this is a highly specific fact issue and probably no
general rule can be fashioned other than a direction to the court to consider what
was reasonable in the circumstances. One way to provide further guidance would be
to discuss a variety of cases in a lengthy comment to indicate the kind of resolu-
tions that appear to be fair, and those that do not appear to be.
102. See Clifford, supra note 25, at 1050-53. To extend these laws beyond their
present scope would, of course, go beyond the approach of adding consumer provi-
sions only when substantial consensus exists, and may be otherwise inadvisable as
well. Id. at 1105. Thus, again a detailed comment may be the best that can be
devised for many situations.
103. See WHITE & SUMYMERS, supra note 90, at 368-77 (discussing the buyer's right
to revoke acceptance).
104. Compare U.C.C. § 1-107 (1990) (allowing written waiver without consideration
of a claim arising out of an alleged breach) with UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §
1.107, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (1974 Act) (imposing several limitations and restrictions on
waiver by a consumer).
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accepted late payments." 5 This Article, however, does not at-
tempt to provide an exhaustive list of consumer provisions that
might be incorporated in a revised Article 2. Rather, it suggests
a principled plan for accomplishing whatever changes are to be
made, as well as an illustration of the application of the princi-
ples suggested with examples. Clearly, unless we identify some
common ground for going forward with the revision of U.C.C.
Article 2, notwithstanding some past success at Code revision
without sufficient attention to consumer issues, it is unlikely
that U.C.C. Article 2 can be rewritten and enacted without an
unacceptable loss of uniformity.
105. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Margolin v. Franklin, 270 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); Van Bibber v.
Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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